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Functionality stealing

Definition

Functionality stealing is the branch of model extraction whose target is what the victim model does rather than what it is. The adversary queries the victim’s prediction API, keeps the returned labels or probability vectors as training targets, and fits a substitute (a “knockoff” or “surrogate”) on those pairs. Success is measured on the victim’s task, against ground truth on the victim’s test distribution, so a substitute that reaches comparable accuracy has stolen the functionality even where it disagrees with the victim example by example. The other branch, which recovers exact parameters, hyperparameters, or architecture, is scored on fidelity to the victim instead (Tramèr et al., 2016; Jagielski et al., 2020).

Mechanically the attack is knowledge distillation without the teacher’s cooperation: a student fit to a teacher’s outputs. The adversarial version drops distillation’s usual assumptions. The adversary works from black-box query access, pays per query, need not know the victim’s architecture, and need not hold data from the victim’s training distribution, since the query pool only has to elicit informative responses. That combination is what makes the goal cheap relative to the cost of building the victim, and it is why defenses tend to act on the returned outputs or to accept the copy and try to mark it.

Papers that use this concept

Variants and traps

  • Accuracy and fidelity are different scores and a paper’s numbers only make sense against one of them. A high-accuracy substitute can disagree with the victim on individual inputs; a high-fidelity copy reproduces the victim’s mistakes as well as its answers.
  • “Stealing the model” is ambiguous between the two goals. Functionality stealing recovers no weights, so a defense that protects the weights, and an ownership claim that inspects them, both miss it.

See also

References

  • Jagielski, M., Carlini, N., Berthelot, D., Kurakin, A., and Papernot, N. “High Accuracy and High Fidelity Extraction of Neural Networks.” USENIX Security Symposium, 2020.
  • Tramèr, F., Zhang, F., Juels, A., Reiter, M.K., and Ristenpart, T. “Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs.” USENIX Security Symposium, 2016.