Concepts
Background concepts the papers rely on. Each page is a short, self-contained explanation you can read on its own or reach from a paper that uses it.
| Concept | Summary |
|---|---|
| activation-steering | Controlling an LLM at inference by adding, subtracting, or projecting out a concept direction in its activations; steering vectors and their limits. |
| adaptive-attack | An attack built against the specific defense it is evaluated on; the security-evaluation standard a defense claim rests on. |
| adversarial-examples | The evasion phenomenon: small input perturbations that flip a prediction. |
| adversarial-threat-model | How an adversary’s power is specified: perturbation set, knowledge, timing. |
| adversarial-training | Training on adversarially perturbed inputs as a defense. |
| automated-program-repair | Generating a patch that makes a faulty program pass a correctness oracle; generate-and-validate (GenProg), plausible-vs-correct, and learned neural repair. |
| backdoor-attacks | A trigger-fired hidden behavior trained into a model via data poisoning; the overcapacity that enables it and its reuse as the mechanism behind black-box model watermarking. |
| ciphertext-packing | Packing many plaintext values into the SIMD slots of one homomorphic ciphertext so a single add or multiply acts on all of them; slot rotations and the amortization and communication savings it buys. |
| code-language-models | Transformers pretrained on source code that complete or generate programs from a prompt; Codex, code completion, and byte-pair tokenization. |
| contrastive-prompt-pairs | Eliciting a concept’s direction from a matched pair of prompts that differ only in the target concept, by differencing their activations. |
| convolutional-neural-network | CNNs for image classification: learned convolutional filters, pooling, a softmax head, and the standard backbones (AlexNet, VGG, ResNet, DenseNet). |
| cross-entropy | The negative log probability a model assigns to the correct answer; the default training objective and the per-example privacy signal. |
| cryptographic-commitment | A binding, hiding token published for a value and opened later; with a time-stamped public log it gives proof of priority for ownership claims. |
| data-poisoning | Corrupting training data to change what a model learns: availability vs targeted/integrity poisoning, backdoors as the trigger-conditioned subclass, and why training-set sanitization defenses presume data access. |
| decoding-strategies | How an LLM turns next-token distributions into text: greedy, temperature, top-k, top-p, and prefilling. |
| dense-retrieval | Retrieving documents by embedding the query and passages and ranking by vector similarity (top-k); the neural alternative to BM25 and the retriever inside RAG. |
| differential-privacy | The formal bound on any single example’s influence; DP-SGD and the epsilon guarantee. |
| direct-preference-optimization | Aligning an LM to pairwise preferences directly, without a separate reward model or RL loop; the DPO alternative to RLHF. |
| empirical-risk-minimization | Average training loss as a proxy for expected loss; the baseline objective. |
| federated-learning | Training one shared model across clients that keep their data local, exchanging updates with a server; local vs central DP and why locality alone is not privacy. |
| fgsm | The one-step gradient-sign attack and its role as a baseline. |
| fine-tuning | Continuing training of a pretrained model on a smaller task- or behavior-specific dataset; full vs parameter-efficient (LoRA) updates, and how it undoes earlier stages. |
| functionality-stealing | The model-extraction goal of a substitute that performs the victim’s task, scored on task accuracy rather than on agreeing with the victim. |
| gaussian-mechanism | Sensitivity and noise calibrated to it; the additive-noise recipe behind DP mechanisms. |
| gradient-clipping | Norm-rescaling gradients; a training stabilizer that, per example, becomes a sensitivity bound. |
| gradient-masking | The defense failure mode where gradients become useless but worst-case loss stays high. |
| group-fairness | Constraining a model to behave equitably across groups defined by a sensitive attribute; demographic parity, equalized odds, equality of opportunity, and pre/in/post-processing enforcement. |
| hardware-virtualization | Hypervisors and the Arm virtualization extensions (EL2, two-stage address translation, the IOMMU) that give each VM an isolated view of memory and devices; the substrate beneath virtualization-based TEEs. |
| homomorphic-encryption | Computing directly on ciphertexts so the result decrypts to the function of the plaintexts; partially / leveled / fully HE, bootstrapping, and the CKKS scheme for approximate real arithmetic. |
| indirect-prompt-injection | Prompt injection whose instructions arrive through content the application retrieves or is handed, planted by a third party. |
| instruction-tuning | Fine-tuning a base LM to follow natural-language instructions; the instruction-following objective. |
| jailbreak | A prompt that elicits behavior a safety-trained LLM was trained to refuse; distinct from adversarial examples. |
| kl-divergence | Asymmetric measure of how far one distribution is from a reference; the per-token unit of how much alignment moved the base model. |
| knowledge-distillation | Training a student to match a teacher’s output distribution (soft labels); its equivalence to minimizing KL and its link to model extraction. |
| language-model-pretraining | Autoregressive next-token pretraining; the pretraining objective, distribution, and base model. |
| likelihood-ratio-test | Deciding between two hypotheses by their likelihood ratio; Neyman-Pearson optimality. |
| linear-probing | Training a linear classifier on intermediate activations to test whether a property is linearly decodable; supervised concept directions. |
| linear-representation-hypothesis | The hypothesis that networks encode high-level concepts as linear directions in activation space; concept directions and word-vector analogies. |
| llm-tool-use | An LLM emitting calls to external tools and acting on their outputs; chaining calls toward a goal yields an agent. |
| llm-watermarking | Embedding a hidden, human-imperceptible signal in a generative model’s output text for provenance: decoding-time logit/sampling biasing vs post-hoc editing, statistical detection, and the contrast with model-weight watermarking. |
| lp-norms | ℓ0 / ℓ2 / ℓ-infinity balls as perturbation budgets and proxies for perceptual similarity. |
| machine-unlearning | Removing chosen training data’s influence from a trained model without full retraining; exact vs approximate unlearning and the right-to-be-forgotten motivation. |
| mechanistic-interpretability | Bottom-up interpretability that reverse-engineers a network into circuits of neurons or features; the foil to top-down representation-level analysis. |
| membership-inference | Predicting whether a specific example was in a model’s training set; the standard privacy audit. |
| memorization | Per-example fitting, random-label capacity, and the long-tail argument; the signal privacy attacks exploit. |
| model-explanations | Post-hoc explanations released with a prediction: feature attribution, influence-based, and counterfactual/recourse; what they reveal and the attack surface they open. |
| model-extraction | Attacks that reproduce a deployed model’s parameters, hyperparameters, architecture, or functionality from query access; the fidelity-versus-accuracy axes and the MLaaS setting. |
| model-fingerprinting | Identifying a model by properties it already has, typically its decision boundary, rather than by a marker planted at training time. |
| model-partitioning | Splitting a DNN across a trusted execution environment and an untrusted accelerator (GPU): shielding a privacy-sensitive subset in the enclave while offloading the rest in the clear for speed; on-device TSDP and the security-versus-utility trade-off. |
| model-watermarking | Embedding an owner-verifiable marker in a trained model; white-box (in the weights) vs black-box (backdoor-based trigger set) verification, and the assumption that the owner controls training. |
| mutual-information | How much observing one variable reveals about another; the KL divergence between the joint distribution and the product of the marginals, its entropy decomposition, and its role as an information-leakage and rate-distortion measure. |
| perplexity | How well an LM predicts a sequence (exponentiated cross-entropy); the LM quality metric and the per-example membership signal in extraction attacks. |
| privacy-budget | The (epsilon, delta) budget, composition theorems, accountants, and amplification by subsampling. |
| projected-gradient-descent | Gradient step plus projection; the constrained-optimization primitive behind the PGD attack. |
| prompt-injection | Adversarial instructions in a prompt or ingested content that override the intended task; direct and indirect. |
| quantization | Mapping floating-point weights and activations to low-precision integers under a shared scale; the deployment lever and the precondition for expressing a model in a proof circuit. |
| red-teaming | Probing a model for policy-violating outputs to inform safety training and as an evaluation benchmark. |
| reinforcement-learning | Training an agent to maximize a reward from chosen actions; policy gradients, the multi-armed bandit, and the gradient-bandit update. |
| remote-attestation | A hardware root of trust signs a measurement (a quote) of the code and data that ran, checked by a remote verifier; property-based attestation adds reference values from a trusted authority, and ML property cards (model card, datasheet, inference card). |
| retrieval-augmented-generation | Conditioning generation on documents fetched at inference time; retrieved text shares the context window with the instructions. |
| rlhf | Aligning an LM to human preferences via a reward model and policy optimization with a KL penalty to the base model. |
| robust-optimization | Min-max / saddle-point optimization and Danskin’s theorem. |
| roc-curves | TPR/FPR trade-offs, AUC, balanced accuracy, and why security evaluates at low false-positive rates. |
| safety-training | Training a deployed LLM to refuse restricted behaviors; refusal, RLHF-for-harmlessness, Constitutional AI. |
| secure-inference | Running model inference on a client’s private input against a server’s private model, revealing only the result; HE-, MPC-, and TEE-based instantiations and the interaction / bandwidth cost axes. |
| secure-multiparty-computation | Jointly computing a function over private inputs while revealing only the output; two-party computation, garbled circuits and secret sharing, semi-honest vs malicious adversaries, and simulation-based security. |
| shadow-models | Adversary-trained imitations of the target model used to calibrate membership inference attacks. |
| side-channel | Learning a secret from timing, cache state, memory-access patterns, or speculative execution rather than from outputs; the class TEE guarantees usually exclude. |
| singular-value-decomposition | Factoring a matrix into singular vectors and values; the rank, the four fundamental subspaces, and the null space as the inputs a matrix maps to zero. |
| softmax | Logits and the map that turns them into a probability distribution; the attention mixing weights, the API leakage decision, and the expensive nonlinearity under encryption. |
| software-vulnerability | A security-relevant code defect an attacker can exploit; MITRE’s CWE catalog and Top 25, and the concrete / localize / confirm distinction. |
| stochastic-gradient-descent | Minibatch gradient descent; the default optimizer and the source of attack gradients. |
| taint-tracking | Dynamic information-flow tracking (DIFT): labelling data at a source and propagating the label to every derived value, then enforcing a policy on where it may flow; software vs hardware (tag-bit) implementations and the confidentiality / integrity dual uses. |
| temperature | The scalar dividing the logits before the softmax; the decoding randomness knob and the distillation softening knob. |
| transfer-learning | Reusing representations across tasks; ImageNet pretraining then fine-tuning, for higher accuracy with less task-specific data. |
| transferability | Adversarial examples crafted on one model often fool another; the basis of black-box transfer attacks. |
| transformer | Stacked self-attention and feed-forward blocks with residual connections; the residual stream, and the nonlinearities that dominate encrypted and proved inference. |
| trusted-execution-environment | Hardware-isolated enclaves that shield code and data from a malicious OS, with remote attestation; Intel SGX, Arm TrustZone, AMD SEV, Sanctum, and their side-channel and run-time-attack limits. |
| white-box-black-box | Adversary knowledge assumptions, from full weights to query-only access. |
| zero-knowledge-proof | A proof that a computation on a secret witness was done correctly while revealing nothing about it; prover and verifier, completeness / soundness / zero-knowledge, interactive vs non-interactive (Fiat-Shamir), succinct proofs / zk-SNARKs, and the arithmetic-circuit model. |
| zero-shot-prompting | Eliciting a task from a pretrained LM through the prompt alone, no examples and no fine-tuning; the contrast with few-shot and with fine-tuning. |
| zeroth-order-optimization | Gradient-free optimization that estimates a descent direction from forward-pass loss differences along random directions; the two-point/SPSA estimator and the MeZO line for memory-efficient LLM fine-tuning. |